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ABSTRACT
We study the electricity consumption of San Diego-area households following a series of
price changes and related events during California's energy crisis in 2000-01. The analysis uses a
five-year panel of disaggregate billing and weather data for a random sample of 70,000 households.
In contrast to prior work, these data allow us to proceed without behavioral assumptions regarding
a consumer's knowledge of energy prices. 
We find that after a rapid price increase in summer 2000, consumption fell substantially over
about 60 days, averaging 12% per household; consumption then rebounded to within 3% of pre-
crisis levels after a price cap was imposed. Under the price cap, public appeals for energy
conservation and a remunerative voluntary conservation program had significant, but transitory,
effects. Further, a large share of households reduced electricity consumption substantially (over
10%) but saved small monetary amounts ($10 or less). Overall, the results indicate consumers may
be far more responsive to pecuniary and non-pecuniary incentives for altering their energy use than
is commonly believed.
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Households in the United States are billed for their electricity use monthly, based on
tariﬀs that change much less frequently. This practice leaves utilities with few options
that they can use to moderate demand during times of tight supply. Traditionally, the
industry has dealt with this lack of ﬂexibility by ensuring that utilities have suﬃcient
capacity or import capability to meet all but extreme demands.
In 1998, California implemented an electricity industry restructuring plan that
loosened regulatory control over wholesale electricity prices and capacity decisions.
Beginning in June 2000, a variety of factors led to a lengthy period of unexpectedly
tight supplies. Because most consumers’ electric rates remained ﬁxed at or near
pre-restructuring levels, the state and utilities had few short-run options they could
employ to reduce demand. This inﬂexibility of retail electricity prices, combined
with escalating wholesale costs, pushed several of the state’s utilities to the brink of
bankruptcy and left a costly ﬁnancial burden on the state.
In the wake of the California crisis and problems elsewhere, numerous propos-
als have been put forward to reform the basic structure of retail electricity pricing.
Many of these proposals envision making consumer prices much more responsive to
supply conditions.1 Unfortunately, there is limited evidence available on how house-
holds might respond in aggregate or individually to the types of price changes seen
during the California crisis. Moreover, it remains an open question how quickly—or
even whether—California’s households are willing and able to reduce their electricity
consumption over short-term horizons.
This paper uses a unique household-level data set to assess consumer reactions
to tight supply conditions both when prices freely vary and when prices are capped.
Our analyses speak not only to energy policy issues, but also more broadly to eco-
nomic questions about whether and how consumers respond to price versus non-price
incentives. Speciﬁcally, we examine the responses of San Diego-area households to
an unprecedented rise and fall in electricity prices, and their response to voluntary
energy conservation incentives when residential prices were subsequently capped. We
use San Diego-area households because at the start of the state’s electricity crisis in
June 2000, a provision of California law allowed the utility serving the San Diego
region to raise its electric rates commensurate with escalating wholesale prices. The
1See, for example, Laﬀerty et al. (2001), Borenstein (2002), or CPUC (2002).
1subsequent retail price increases in San Diego led to an emergency legislative ‘ﬁx’ of
price caps, which remained in eﬀect as the state’s crisis deepened.
Our analysis also complements prior electricity demand studies. Despite several
decades of research, economists’ understanding of how households respond to en-
ergy price changes—both in speed and magnitude—remains far from complete. This
shortcoming persists for electricity because regulatory authorities tightly control price
changes. Thus, discerning the eﬀect of modest price ‘signals’ amid the wide varia-
tion in demand from other sources (such as weather or geography) has long posed
a diﬃcult problem for econometric studies, regardless of technique.2 The experience
of San Diego is valuable because it overcomes this canonical econometric problem in
two unique ways: The industry brieﬂy vacated its traditional checks on consumers’
prices and consumers experienced unprecedented price changes.3
A second feature of the paper examines two post-price cap eﬀorts to curb retail
consumer demand. The ﬁrst of these was an extensive media campaign by the state
of California to promote voluntary energy conservation during the state-wide crisis
in the spring of 2001. The second oﬀered households ﬁnancial rewards for reducing
electricity use during the summer of 2001. We ﬁnd that San Diego-area household
electricity consumption fell substantially during the spring of 2001, the period of ex-
tensive public appeals for energy conservation and media attention to the escalating
crisis. This occurred even though there were no signiﬁcant changes in households’
economic incentives to reduce electricity use. The subsequent remunerative volun-
tary conservation program in the summer of 2001 further reduced demand, and by
magnitudes roughly proportionate to households’ responses to the price spike in 2000.
Nevertheless, both of these programs eﬀects were transitory, ending promptly after
2Some progress on this problem has been made through formal pricing experiments. See especially
Caves and Christensen (1980), Parks and Weitzel (1984), Ham, Mountain and Luke (1997), or CPUC
(2002) and references therein. Unfortunately, truly randomized pricing experiments are rare in this
industry. Most rely upon voluntary participation and small samples, raising familiar attrition- and
selection-bias concerns that impair generalization to the broader population. A recent eﬀort to
address the latter is Ham et al. (1997).
3Ours is not the only examination of San Diegans’ experience. Tabulations in Goldman et
al. (2002) and contemporaneous work by Bushnell and Mansur (2003) examine aggregate data,
reporting smaller results than our study. This is possibly due to compositional eﬀects from diﬀerent
residential and industrial-consumer price changes and demand responses, which are inseparable in the
aggregate data. Smaller eﬀects in aggregate data might also be partly attributable to the diﬃculty of
controlling measurement error in aggregate demand models using standard macroeconomic controls.
Survey work by Lutzenhiser (2002) provides complementary information on San Diegans’ energy
consumption behavior during this time, which we address further below.
2the programs did.
Our analysis is based on a panel of disaggregate utility billing data for a random
sample of approximately 70,000 households in or near San Diego, California. The
data contain among other things each household’s electricity consumption and ex-
penditures from 1997 to 2002. To disentangle the confounding eﬀects of weather,
we matched each sample household to daily weather data from one of twenty-one
weather stations in this region. Our empirical methods are based on household-
speciﬁc diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence comparisons. These compare within-household changes
in average daily electricity consumption during a 2½-year pre-crisis period to consump-
tion changes during and after price changes (or related events) occurred. This within-
household analysis allows us to identify, net of weather-related eﬀects, the variation
in consumption behavior that followed changes in prices and other programs during
California’s electricity crisis. In contrast to prior work, these billing data allow us to
proceed without any speciﬁc assumptions about whether consumers knew marginal
energy prices or whether the household monitors its energy consumption.
The next section provides background information and describes how retail prices
changed. Sections 3 and 4 summarize the data and our methods, respectively. The
main results are presented and discussed in Sections 5 and 6. A brief conclusion
closes.
2 Background: Electricity Pricing in San Diego
In 1996, California enacted an electric utility restructuring law that initiated ma-
jor changes to the industry’s organization and regulation. This section describes
the changes in electricity prices and related events that directly aﬀected San Diego
households during our study period. Readers desiring a more detailed treatment of
California’s electric markets may wish to consult recent and complementary articles
by Blumstein et al. (2002), Joskow (2001), Wilson (2002), or Wolak (2003).
The one million households in the greater San Diego metropolitan area receive elec-
tric service from a single utility, the San Diego Gas and Electric Company (SDG&E).
Figure 1 shows the average electricity price paid by these households from 1998 to
2002.4 There is little variation in this price series across households, except that
4SDG&E’s residential tariﬀ had an increasing block structure through 2001, with a small price
3low-income (poverty-level) households are eligible for slightly subsidized rates. The
dashed line in the ﬁgure shows the average price that households would have paid
if a (binding) price cap had not been imposed in September 2000. From the ﬁgure,
we can distinguish three pricing regimes: (1) a period of basically stable prices, from
January 1998 to May 2000; (2) the extraordinary price spike of summer 2000; and
(3) the period under the price cap beginning September 2000. These changes, along
with two policy interventions under the price cap, are the subjects of our analysis.
The Stable Price Period
Until July 1999, electricity prices in San Diego were regulated in much the same way
that they had been for decades. Price changes were few and far between; other than
a slight downward adjustment in January 1998 (visible at the far left in Figure 1),
average residential electricity prices were essentially ﬂat during the 1990’s. In July
1999, however, the regulatory system determining these prices changed substantially.
Rather than set prices through periodic regulatory hearings, the tariﬀs determining
retail electricity prices were formally indexed to the price of power on regional whole-
sale markets. Thus, if wholesale market prices increased from one week to the next,
this increase would appear in consumers’ bills that month.
The shift to this system of indexing residential electricity prices was part of Cal-
ifornia’s long-term vision for reorganizing its electricity industry. The anticipated
eﬀect was that competition in wholesale markets would, over time, drive down retail
prices below their previously-regulated levels (see White (1996) or Joskow (2001)).
San Diego Gas & Electric was the ﬁrst of California’s utilities to implement this “ﬂoat-
ing prices” system; the state’s other regulated utilities were slated to do so later, had
the electricity crisis not intervened.
During its ﬁrst year, the change to this new system of electricity pricing was almost
entirely transparent to the residential consumer. Although the wholesale price index
was printed on households’ monthly statements, its use resulted in little change in
electric bills. As Figure 1 shows, average prices continued at basically the same level
diﬀerence (two cents per KWh) between the two blocks. The average price series in Figure 1 is the
total revenue per KWh sold under this tariﬀ, based on a large random sample of bills (described
further below). Our average price calculations include franchise fees (which are city-speciﬁc) and
excise taxes (which are small), but exclude special rebates (discussed below). There is no state
sales tax on electricity in California. The nonlinearity of the residential tariﬀ accounts for the slight
wiggles in the average price series in the ﬁgure.
4over the year starting July 1999 as the year prior, except for two minor ‘blips’ at the
peaks of the 1999 summer cooling and winter heating seasons. The 2½-year period
from January 1998 to May 2000 was thus one of stable electricity prices, although the
regulatory and market system determining these prices changed dramatically in the
interim.
T h eP r i c eS p i k ea n dC a p
In June 2000, California and western U.S. wholesale electricity markets experienced
an unprecedented run-up in prices.5 Because San Diego residential electricity prices
were now indexed to the wholesale market, these price increases promptly appeared in
households’ monthly bills. Figure 1 shows that San Diego households’ average prices
increased from their historical average of approximately 10 cents per kilowatt-hour
(KWh) to over 23 cents per KWh in a span of about three months. The magnitude
and speed of this price increase substantially exceeds anything previously experienced
in the industry’s history.
Because electricity price changes under this system were not announced (or even
known) a month in advance, they comprised a true ‘price shock’ when consumers re-
ceived their June 2000 bills. Further increases in prices over the next two months (see
again Figure 1) generated a storm of public protest and, ultimately, appeals for leg-
islative intervention. By the end of August, the California state legislature responded
by imposing a retail price cap on residential and small-commercial electricity rates in
the San Diego region. The cap eﬀectively limited residential prices to 13.5 cents per
KWh, and has been binding ever since.
Although the price cap ﬁrst appeared in consumer’s bills in September 2000, it
was legislatively made retroactive to June 1, 2000. To carry this out, in the fall
of 2000 SDG&E gave each of its residential customers a billing credit equal to the
diﬀerence between what the household paid for electricity from June through August
and what it would have paid under the (retroactively imposed) price cap. These
credits appeared on households’ bills in October and November.
There are no systematic data describing San Diegans’ expectations about electric-
5The causes and consequences of the wholesale price run-up are many, including increases in
production costs (natural gas and air permits, chieﬂy), ﬂaws in California’s wholesale market de-
sign, and the behavior of suppliers. For a more complete discussion, see, e.g., Borenstein (2002),
Borenstein, Bushnell, and Wolak (2002), Joskow and Kahn (2002), or Wolak (2003).
5ity prices during this period. We do, however, know a great deal about the information
available to them. There is little reason to believe that a typical consumer anticipated
the June 2000 price spike. But by the end of June 2000, a household attentive to
the media’s coverage of this market would have been aware that the wholesale prices
aﬀecting monthly bills were increasing steadily. By the end of July, the increase in
prices should have been apparent to most consumers.
The possibility of a legislative price cap appears to have ﬁrst received media
coverage in the second and third week of August 2000; its enactment in the ﬁnal
week of August was highly-publicized. Consequently, an attentive consumer might
have been aware of the price spike as early as June, and the likelihood of its recision
by mid- to late August. An inattentive consumer, by contrast, might not have noticed
the electricity price increase until opening its electric bill in late June or early July—
and not noticed the price cap’s eﬀect until receiving its electric bill for September.
Post-Cap Interventions
Although the price cap expediently dissipated consumer uproar over the price spike,
maintaining the cap created other problems. Chief among these was the fact that
prices on regional wholesale markets, over which California policy-makers had no
authority, now exceeded SDG&E’s retail prices by a considerable margin (see again
Figure 1). This same situation aﬀected the state’s other regulated utilities, who had
not yet moved to the ﬂoating prices system and sold electricity at regulated rates
similar to San Diego’s capped price. Essentially, the state’s utilities were buying
high and obligated to sell low, losing money with each kilowatt-hour consumed. This
unstable situation quickly pushed the utilities toward insolvency, turning a ﬁnancial
crisis into one that threatened the state with shortages and electricity rationing (via
periodic rotating power outages) by the winter of 2000-01.
Two ways to prevent such rationing are to increase prices, or to lower consumption
by other means. Rather than increase retail prices and face the same political uproar
that occurred in San Diego the previous summer, state leaders threw considerable
resources into promoting energy conservation. For households, these conservation
eﬀorts took two forms. First, during the winter and spring of 2001, state agencies and
utilities undertook a large media campaign to urge energy conservation and educate
people about how to reduce energy use. In essence, this amounted to a massive public
appeal for voluntary energy conservation. These public appeals, and the deepening
6electricity crisis, received prominent media coverage throughout the spring of 2001.
The second aspect of these eﬀorts was an electricity conservation rebate program.
Faced with the possibility of widespread shortages (‘rolling blackouts’) during the
summer of 2001, the state adopted a program of ﬁnancially rewarding consumers for
reducing electricity use. Speciﬁcally, beginning in June 2001, residential customers
were awarded rebates if their electricity use fell suﬃciently from their previous year’s
level. In the San Diego region, this program’s parameters were set so a household
received a 20% credit against its monthly electric bill if the household’s electricity use
fell 15% or more from the same month of the prior year. No adjustments were made
for weather, prior conservation eﬀorts, or other factors that might aﬀect a household’s
electricity use. The program was implemented through utilities’ billing systems using
households’ account histories.
California’s eﬀort to alter individual consumption behavior through these pro-
grams has provoked considerable attention and skepticism regarding their eﬀective-
ness. On the one hand, strategies that successfully reduce energy use without directly
taxing it (or otherwise raising price) are of great interest to energy and environmental
policy makers. Yet it is an open question whether promoting (voluntary) electricity
conservation has any eﬀect if consumers’ economic incentives to modify their behavior
remain unchanged. This is the situation San Diego households faced during the ﬁrst
six months of 2001.
By contrast, the price-rebate program that commenced in June 2001 changed
a household’s economic incentives for electricity use in a novel and signiﬁcant way.
While the price spike of summer 2000 and price-rebate program of summer 2001
had diﬀerent informational and economic structures, they provide complementary
evidence on households’ willingness to reduce electricity consumption given pecuniary
i n c e n t i v e st od os o .
In sum, our empirical agenda is to assess how households’ electricity consumption
responded to four successive events: the spike in consumers’ electricity prices during
the summer of 2000, the price cap imposed in early fall 2000, the state’s public appeals
for electricity conservation and concurrent crisis media attention during the winter
and spring of 2001, and the electricity-conservation rebate program oﬀered in summer
2001.
73D a t a
We examine these events using the Household Electricity Research Billing Sample
(HERBS), a large panel of San Diego Gas and Electric Company residential util-
ity bills covering the time periods we study. Each observation in the HERBS is a
consumer’s monthly bill, including total electricity consumption, exact billing-period
dates, the total electricity bill, line-item charges, taxes, any special discounts or re-
bates, and so on. The data also include information on the location of the residence
served, tariﬀ schedule parameters, the billing cohort (described below), and the total
bill the household would have paid absent the price cap. We constructed the HERBS
with permission of SDG&E from their billing system data archives.
Our sampling design selected 70,000 accounts, at random, from the population of
all residential accounts served by SDG&E in March 2001. The number of accounts
in this population is the same as the number of households in San Diego County and
we therefore use the two terms synonymously. We follow each sample household’s
account history backward 3½ years to October 1997 (or to the date it established
service, if later) and forward one year to April 2002 (or to the date it ended service,
if earlier). Slightly less than 1,000 households enter the HERBS each month prior to
March 2001, and a similar number exit each month after March 2001.
This sample entry and exit raises the possibility of bias, if household electricity
consumption is associated with mobility. Table 1 provides information on this issue.
Households in the sample since October 1997 (row (1)) have higher consumption
levels, and lower consumption growth rates, than households that enter the sample
later (rows (2) and (3)). These diﬀerences are not surprising, inasmuch as households
who have moved recently tend to inhabit smaller residences (e.g., apartments) and
may spend several years acquiring new appliances. A similar pattern is evident with
respect to households exiting the sample, although the diﬀerence in consumption
growth rates between attritants (row (4)) and non-attritants (row (5)) is negligible.
We note these diﬀerences between ‘movers’ and ‘stayers’ for two reasons. First, the
fact that entry/attrition may be non-random with respect to electricity use implies
that raw statistics from the HERBS for periods far from March 2001 may be unrep-
resentative of the general population. For example, unweighted averages of sample
households’ consumption growth rates are likely to be biased downward as one moves
away from March 2001, due to the progressive omission of ‘movers’ who tend to have
8higher growth rates (see columns 4 and 5 in Table 1).
The second problem is that we cannot estimate consumption responses to crisis
events for late-stage entrants to the sample. This group is identiﬁed in row (3) of
Table 1. In essence, the statistical models we employ require suﬃcient consumption
observations during the stable price period to identify how a household’s consumption
subsequently changed during the crisis period. This leaves us with approximately
46,800 sample households for whom we can measure individual consumption responses
to the electricity crisis.
These sample-entry/attrition issues are a concern for our analysis insofar as they
create bias when we aggregate consumption responses estimated for individual house-
holds to obtain population-level ﬁgures. Appendix A describes how we deal with this
problem using a sample weighting procedure. These weights are calculated using
statistical methods developed to handle missing data (see, for example, Little and
Rubin (2002)). In the results that follow, we adjust our estimates (unless indicated
otherwise) to account for sample entry/attrition so as to provide better estimates for
the population of all San Diego MSA households. In the end, however, the results we
report below are largely robust to how we adjust for entry/attrition in the HERBS.6
The principal reason for this is that our results are based on within-household con-
sumption changes, and the diﬀerences between ‘movers’ and ‘stayers’ in this metric
both before and after the crisis (see columns 4 and 5 of Table 1) are small in com-
parison to typical household consumption responses we estimate to electricity crisis
events.
Timing Issues and Cohorts
One feature of the data to clarify is the timing of bills, which we exploit to understand
how quickly consumers reacted to price changes and other events. SDG&E uses a
cohort-based (or ‘staggered’) billing system, wherein each household is assigned to
one of 21 cohorts. Each weekday, one cohort’s meters are read, their current billing
period closes, and their next billing period begins. The following weekday the same
events occur for the next cohort, and so on. The “monthly” bill for a household in
the 10th cohort, for instance, covers a period ending within two days of the 14th of
6This was not our initial expectation, however. Our concerns about more serious entry/attrition
biases motivated our considerable eﬀorts to address with problem, as detailed in Appendix A.
9the month, with the bill arriving a few days later.7
These timing issues aﬀect the way we handle the data in two important ways.
First, to track changes in consumption through time, we group and compare the
consumption data by billing cohort. This enables us to track almost daily changes in
consumption behavior. Second, because of diﬀerences in the length of monthly billing
periods, we compare households’ bills based on their average daily consumption (the
household’s total consumption for the billing period (in kilowatt-hours) divided by
the number of days in the billing period).8
Weather Data
One limitation of utility billing data is that they do not include household-speciﬁc
weather information. In practice, this might not be much of a problem if most house-
holds experienced the same weather. In San Diego’s service territory, however, the
weather can and does diﬀer dramatically across households’ locations. This territory
includes temperate coastal areas, near inland areas with considerable summer heat,
mountain areas that receive snow in winter and remain cool in summer, and (lightly
populated) regions of the Sonora desert with extreme hot and cold weather. Since
home electricity use is highly sensitive to weather, it is important to account for this
variation to avoid mis-specifying the conditions a household actually experienced.
To this end, we used the nine-digit zip code information in the HERBS to map
each sample household to one of 21 National Weather Service (NWS) stations. This
process matches a household to a local weather station considering both proximity
and elevation.9 The 21 weather stations are located throughout SDG&E’s service
territory, but are concentrated near population centers.
We construct a household’s weather variables using the matched weather station’s
7Occasionally, a meter cannot be read on the scheduled cycle-closing day, but is read a few days
later. Actual read dates are recorded in our data. In rare cases, SDG&E postpones a bill until
the following month because it cannot read a meter (billing the household for two months). In our
analyses, we treat the middle month(s) as missing. Because it is willing to postpone billing, SDG&E
estimates very few bills.
8Because of the cohort system, SDG&E may send a shorter ‘start-up’ or ‘closing’ bill when a
household moves into or out of the area. Since these periods commonly reﬂect highly irregular use
(such as a dwelling temporarily empty), we exclude a small number of bills in the data that cover
start-up or closing periods of less than 15 days. We also drop a very small number of irregular bills
that cover more than 60 days.
9The weather data are from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
daily temperature ﬁles available at www.noaa.gov.
10data. The weather variables are billing-period heating and cooling degree-days; these
are standard measures of electric heating and cooling demands. Cooling degree-days
are (a discrete approximation to) the positive part of the temperature time path
less 65°F, integrated over time.10 High values occur in the summer, reﬂecting high
demand for cooling services; cooling degree-days are usually zero in winter. Heating
degree-days approximate the negative part of the temperature time path less 65°F
over the billing period. They are large in winter months, reﬂecting high demand for
home heating, and usually zero (or nearly so) in summer. We calculate a household’s
heating and cooling degree-day values using the exact start and end dates for each
bill, standardized by the number of billing days.
Table 2 summarizes how cooling degree days and electricity consumption varied
from 1998 to 2001. The top panel reveals that San Diegan’s cooling degree-days vary
considerably over time. Most importantly, 1999 was substantially cooler than 2000;
cooling degree-days in August and September 2000 increased more than 60 percent
from the same period in 1999.11 An increase of this magnitude would customarily
produce a much greater demand for electricity, ceteris paribus.
This large variation in weather makes direct casual inferences about changes in
consumption between the electricity-crisis period (2000-01) and the preceding years of
1998-99 problematic. For instance, although prices more than doubled from August
1999 to August 2000, the lower panel of Table 2 reveals that average household
electricity consumption slightly increased. The obvious explanation for this increase
is the oﬀsetting eﬀect of weather changes between August 2000 and August 1999.
Our chief task is thus to develop a method for disentangling the eﬀects of weather
and prices on consumption.
10A household’s cooling degree-days for the billing period running from calendar date d1 to d2 are
CDD =
d2−1
t=d1 max{A(t) − 65,0},w h e r eA(t) is the average of the high and low temperatures in
°F at the household’s local (matched) weather station on date t. Heating degree days (HDD) are
computed with the summand replaced by max{65 − A(t),0}.
11The large variation across years is due in part to an El Niño Paciﬁc weather disturbance during
1998-99. As noted earlier, the monthly averages also mask considerable variation in cooling degree
days across households. For instance, in August 2000 households located along the coast experienced
less than 150 cooling degree days, while those in the inland desert areas averaged over 700.
114 Empirical Strategy and Methods
This section motivates and summarizes our methods. These are designed to overcome
two key problems in the estimation of consumers’ responses to the electricity crisis.
First, from a research design standpoint, there is the problem that everyone in San
Diego experienced the same price changes at about the same time (see again the
discussion of Figure 1). Thus, there is no way to construct the equivalent of two
randomly assigned ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ groups. All households in the population
experienced the same price changes in 2000, public appeals in 2001, and so on.
The second diﬃculty is that it is far from clear what consumers knew about prices
at the time. As noted earlier, the price indexing system in place between July 1999
and September 2000 determined the price consumers would pay when bills were issued.
Consequently, during the summer of 2000 a consumer might have behaved as if its
prior month’s price would apply, or behaved as if a much higher marginal price would
apply, or anything in between. The same uncertainty applies in the fall with respect
to the price cap. Further complicating matters is the fact that the perception of what
price would be in eﬀect each month surely diﬀered across consumers—depending,
for example, on how attuned the household was to media coverage of the unfolding
electricity crisis. The upshot of these issues is that it is diﬃcult to correctly specify
statistical models that assume, implicitly or explicitly, what the consumer knew about
prices at the time consumption occurred.
Our approach handles these problems by exploiting the fact that we observe con-
sumption in two distinct ‘regimes’: The ﬁrst is the pre-crisis period, during which
prices did not vary. The second is the crisis period, during which prices ﬂuctuated
and related events transpired. This sequence allows us to use variation in consump-
tion during the stable-price period to disentangle the eﬀects of some confounding
factors (weather, in particular) during the subsequent crisis period. In essence, we
are using a household’s consumption during the period when prices were held ﬁxed
as the ‘control’ (and implicit counter-factual), and contrasting this with consumption
following crisis-related events.
Our basic unit of analysis is the change in a household’s average daily consumption
(ADC) between one billing period and the same billing period twelve months earlier
(i.e., twelve-month diﬀerences). Twelve-month diﬀerencing removes seasonal eﬀects
of no immediate interest, such as the number of daylight hours per day. These eﬀects
12can also be household speciﬁc, as with a family that vacations each August or that
has enormous outdoor light displays during the December holidays.12
We divide the variation in a household’s twelve-month consumption diﬀerences
into two distinct categories. The ﬁrst are factors idiosyncratic to the household.
These include remodeling the kitchen during the intervening year, having a teenager
leave home for college, changing the month of a family vacation between one year and
the next, replacing a failing major appliance (for reasons unrelated to the electricity
crisis), and so on.13 Averaged across all households, things in this ﬁrst category de-
ﬁne the secular trend in residential electricity consumption. By contrast, the second
category includes non-idiosyncratic factors that induce correlation in consumption
changes among households. These include common price changes, crisis media atten-
tion and the public appeals noted earlier, and regional weather patterns.
As is well known from the electricity demand literature, much of the variation in
electricity consumption comes from changes in the weather. This is particularly true
in California. (See, for example, studies by Acton, Mitchell, and Mowill (1976), Parti
and Parti (1980), and Reiss and White (2001).) The close correspondence between
weather and electricity consumption in the San Diego area is summarized in Figure
2. The solid line in Figure 2 shows average daily consumption by billing cohort. The
dashed and dotted lines similarly depict heating and cooling degrees experienced by
these billing cohorts during their billing months.
Figure 2 shows that average daily consumption varies considerably over the course
of a year. Most of this variation closely coincides with the variation in the weather.
For example, during 1998, consumption is at its highest in January when heating
degree-days peak. Electricity usage peaks again in the summer as cooling degree-
days peak. From peaks to troughs, consumption typically varies 20 to 30 percent.
Thus, it is important to account for this variation before we can begin to address the
inﬂuence of crisis-related events on consumption.
We assume that a household’s same-month, year-over-year electricity consumption
12From prior work we also know that electricity consumption depends greatly on appliance stocks,
dwelling structure attributes, and demographics (e.g., the number of children in the home); see Reiss
and White (2001). Because these factors are unobserved in our billing data, here we seek to explain
variation in consumption only within, rather than between, households.
13We term these factors idiosyncratic in the statistical sense that even if we knew such an event
occurred for a household, that information would be of no value for predicting the contemporaneous
consumption change of another randomly-sampled household.
13changes can be decomposed into its pre-crisis trend, crisis-period responses, weather,
and idiosyncratic factors according to








m +( wicm − wic,m−12)
 βi + εicm (1)
where xicm is the ADC of household i in cohort c for the billing period ending in month
m (indexed serially), wicm a vector of contemporaneous weather-related covariates,
and εicm an idiosyncratic shock. Here Ipre
m is an indicator variable for pre-crisis months
(May 2000 or earlier), and Ipost
m similarly for months after the crisis begins (June 2000
and later). The δ’s and β’s are household-speciﬁc parameters to be estimated. We
allow δ
post
icm to vary by month, to accommodate heterogeneity in how rapidly households
react to crisis events.
Although we compute things slightly diﬀerently, a standard measure of how a
household’s consumption changed from pre-crisis behavior by month m during the






Ultimate interest lies not in the individual values of Dicm, but in its population
distribution and the time-path of the population average Dcm =
Ncm
i=1 Dicm/Ncm,
where Ncm is the cohort population size.
The speciﬁcation in (1) implies a household’s sensitivity to weather is time-
invariant. In reality, this is likely to be implausible for many households. A natural
response to the rise in prices during the summer of 2000, for instance, is to cur-
tail home air conditioning during hot weather. This means that βi during pre-crisis
periods may diﬀer systematically from its value after the crisis begins. Since it is
the change in consumption behavior relative to pre-crisis use patterns that is of in-
terest counter-factually, we estimate the diﬀerence Dicm for each household without
imposing this time-invariance restriction.
A Few Details
To be speciﬁc, we estimate the parameters of (1) the following way. First, we ﬁt to
the (up to) 32 months of pre-crisis data the regression model:
xicm − xic,m−12 = δ
pre
i +( wicm − wic,m−12)
 βi + εicm (2)
14where εicm is assumed mean zero given the weather. This equation is ﬁtted sepa-
rately for each household via ordinary least squares. We then compute the change in
consumption during crisis-period months as actual minus predicted,
 Dicm =[ xicm − xic,m−12] − [ˆ δ
pre
i +( wicm − wic,m−12)
 ˆ βi] (3)
with ˆ δ
pre
i , ˆ βi estimated from pre-crisis data. We expect  Dicm to be close to zero for
any month m prior to the crisis, and non-zero for any month after.14
Two wrinkles remain in estimating the average diﬀerence Dcm from the individual
values  Dicm. First, as noted earlier there is the matter of sample entry and attrition.





where ncm is the observed number of households in cohort c in month m,a n dωicm is
a time-dependent sampling weight that diverges from 1/ncm to account for entry and
attrition (see Appendix A).
Second, in practice it is statistically desirable to pool estimates from more than
one year of pre-crisis data. Thus, in estimating consumption changes relative to the
same month of pre-crisis years, we use a pooled diﬀerence estimator of the form
 D
p





cm diﬀers from  Dcm only in that the values of x and w at 12-month lags in
(3) are replaced by their values at 24-month lags (with ˆ δ
pre
i doubled).15 Pooling two
estimates in this way reduces variability attributable to idiosyncratic departures from
a household’s pre-crisis trend in any one year during the pre-crisis period—a source of
14 Because the electricity crisis continued into the summer of 2001, the 12-month lag structure
in (1-3) is not universally appropriate. For the months of June 2001 and following, interest still
centers on how consumption diﬀered from its (weather-adjusted) pattern during pre-crisis years.
Consequently, to compute a value for  Dicm when m is later than May 2001, it is necessary to replace
xic,m−12 and wic,m−12 in (3) with their values at 24-month-lags and double ˆ δ
pre
i . This implies  Dicm
for m of August 2001 is relative to the pre-crisis month of August 1999, not the crisis-period month
of August 2000.
15In constructing the 24-lag analog for the pooled diﬀerence estimator, the coeﬃcient estimates
in (3) are still computed using (2) as written.
15statistical ‘noise’ from our perspective. The pooled diﬀerence estimator  D
p
cm is thus
the average change in within-household consumption between month m and the same
months of pre-crisis years, less the change we would expect on the basis of weather
and pre-crisis trend alone.16 This is the statistic we report in the time-series results
below.
Some comments regarding speciﬁcation are in order. Our use of a linear-in-the-
parameters speciﬁcation for the model in (1) and (2) is driven by the results of a
large literature (principally in statistics and engineering) on the relationship between
weather and electricity sales. A key paper in this literature is Engle et al. (1986),
who examine parametric and non-parametric techniques for modeling this relationship
with residential billing data from various utilities. One conclusion from this work is
that the relationship between temperature and electricity demand is linear (or very
close to it) for temperatures above 65°F, and similarly (with a diﬀerent slope) below
65°F.17 For this reason we use the simple and parsimonious speciﬁcation in (2), rather
than less-eﬃcient nonlinear smoothing techniques.18
A second conclusion from this literature is that when measured carefully to account
for billing-cycle timing, local weather, et cetera, the relationship between weather and
residential electricity consumption is tight. When predicting average (or aggregate)
household electricity consumption, parametric linear models of the form in (2) com-
monly have adjusted R-square values of 0.95 or better using degree-day weather data
(see Engle et al. (1986) or EPRI (1983)). This high level of predictive accuracy is
conﬁrmed in the HERBS with our models as well, as shown presently.19
16Apropos note (14), we use 24- and 36-month lags in constructing the pooled diﬀerence estimator
for any month after May 2001.
17These slopes vary widely across utilities; see especially Engle et al. (1986), Figs. 1–4. Such
geographic diﬀerences reﬂect the prevalence of air conditioning and electric space heating among
homes in diﬀerent parts of the country.
18The speciﬁcation in (2), which uses heating and cooling degree-days at base 65°F in w, is a linear
transform of the piecewise-linear relationship (about 65°F) between average daily temperature and
electricity consumption.
19One might also anticipate some degree of serial correlation in εicm, on the basis of various
behavioral considerations (e.g., the lumpiness of durable-appliance replacement timing). In the
data, we ﬁnd little evidence of this. In any event, serial correlation in εicm is only an eﬃciency issue
here, and a small loss of eﬃciency is tolerable given the large sample size.
16Identiﬁcation Issues
Identiﬁcation and interpretation of δ
post
icm and Dcm merit brief discussion. Technically,
an estimate of Dcm will measure the combined eﬀect of everything, other than weather,
that moved average household consumption away from its pre-crisis trend at time m.
Its interpretation as consumers’ responses to prices and other crisis-related events is
justiﬁed under two assumptions. These are (1) that the average pre-crisis secular
trend, ¯ δ pre, would have continued during 2000-01 had the crisis not occurred; and (2)
that households’ weather-sensitivity parameters (the βi’s) are stable over time ‘but-
for’ the crisis. Both of these assumptions are plausible. Moreover, as will become clear
from the results in Sections 5 and 6, small violations of these identifying assumptions
will not imperil the major ﬁndings.
Although identifying assumptions are by nature not directly testable, these two
can be addressed informatively. Assumption (2) is essentially one about the rate at
which air conditioning is installed in residential dwellings. Roughly one-third of homes
in San Diego County have air conditioning, and its prevalence has increased at a low
rate (approximately 1% p.a.) for nearly a decade. The eﬀect of a gradual increase
of this magnitude on our results is negligible; it would take more than double-digit
increase in the percent of homes with air conditioning to discernibly aﬀect our estimate
of the time-path of consumption changes, Dcm. An increase of that magnitude over
one to two years is not a realistic concern.
At issue with assumption (1) is whether there are any unobserved factors that
would have shifted average consumption growth, net of weather, absent the crisis.
The principal quantitative evidence against this possibility is the close ﬁt between
ﬂuctuations in weather and electricity consumption in the data during the pre-crisis
years. Any substantial unobserved factor would have to become inﬂuential in 2000 or
2001, but not be similarly inﬂuential during preceding years. Since the average pre-
crisis secular trend in electricity consumption represents the aggregation of hundreds
of thousands of individual household decisions about appliance purchases, vacations,
remodeling, and so on, it is diﬃcult to conceive that this trend would have changed
abruptly in 2000-01 absent a macroeconomic shock.
One potential point of concern is income. Real personal income per household
grew at 3.5% p.a. from 1997 through 2000 in San Diego, but began to slow in late
172000 and declined slightly in 2001.20 Since estimates of the short-run income elasticity
of residential electricity demand are low, on the order of 0.1, this change is unlikely
to reduce household electricity consumption in 2001 by more than a few tenths of
one percent. Nevertheless, we address the sensitivity of our 2001 results to this issue
directly in Section 6.
Pre-Crisis Period Fit
Table 3 summarizes the coeﬃcient estimates for the approximately 46,800 households
with suﬃcient data to estimate the model (2) using pre-crisis data. The top panel
reports the means and selected percentiles of the raw coeﬃcient estimates across
households; the middle panel presents the same ﬁgures after re-weighting to account
entry/attrition, yielding only minor changes. Although the weather-related parame-
ters’ units make their values diﬃcult to interpret intuitively, the means and medians
are in accord with prior work in this area (cf., Engle et al. (1986), EPRI (1983)).
Note we estimate separate heating- and cooling-sensitivity parameters for in-season
and out-of-season use. The bottom panel converts the weather parameters to elas-
ticities for interpretation. On average, a doubling of temperatures (as measured by
cooling degree-days) between one summer month and the same month of the previous
year implies about at 30% increase in household electricity consumption. (Somewhat
smaller changes occurred between 1998, 1999, and 2000; see Table 2). The analogous
consumption sensitivity to winter temperature changes is about one-third as large.21
The secular trend in household consumption averages between 2.5 and 3.3% per
annum during the pre-crisis period. The table reports separate pre-crisis trend co-
eﬃcient estimates before versus after October 1999. Our motivation for this arose
from income and aggregate electricity consumption data from elsewhere in California,
20Calculated from the BEA’s personal income series for the San Diego MSA, local CPI-U, and
Census Bureau annual household estimates.
21Table 3 also reveals that there is considerable var i a t i o ni nt h ee s t i m a t e dr esponses to the weather
variables, with some estimated eﬀects being small or negative. While it is possible that some
households reduce consumption in response to small increases in heating and cooling degree-days,
our preferred interpretation is that the response of many households is truly zero and that the
negative coeﬃcients reﬂect idiosyncratic factors (e.g., travel, an appliance purchase) that happened
to occur in a month of notable weather change from the previous year. Our prior work using diﬀerent
data for California (Reiss and White (2001)) indicates that households diﬀer substantially in their
response to weather, and a non-trivial fraction of households exhibit no measurable response to
temperature.
18which suggested a change about this time. The estimated diﬀerence in the mean trend
before versus after this point is small and the medians are nearly identical. Additional
investigation revealed no indication of a change in the average trend at other times
during the pre-crisis period. We use the post-October 1999 trend parameters in our
estimates of Dcm during June through December 2000, reported below.
A critical question that needs to be addressed for later analyses is whether the par-
simonious model in (2) predicts consumption accurately (when prices remain ﬁxed).
Figure 3 presents the average actual and predicted consumption changes during the
stable-price period. To facilitate interpretation, we have normalized the vertical units
from ∆KWh to percentages (dividing each data point by the population average daily
consumption during this period, a constant equal to 16.04 KWh). The actual and pre-
dicted series are close, despite the large variation in average consumption and weather
during this period. The overall R-square for the average actual and predicted data
summarized in Figure 3 is 0.97. Notably, the models pick up the substantial 20% drop
in average consumption between August and September of 1998 and 1999; they do
equally well with the 10% increase in consumption in October 1999.22 The most sig-
niﬁcant departure between actual and predicted occurs March-April 2000. After some
investigation, this appears attributable to an unusual pattern of unseasonably-cold
snaps in late spring that year; the time-path of temperature suggests that heating-
degree days may not fully capture the demand for heating at the time. Since this
pattern is not observed in the weather data previously, the models ﬁt this time less
than perfectly. Such a pattern did not recur during 2000 or 2001.
The close agreement between average actual and predicted electricity consump-
tion in our data is not unexpected, given prior work in this area. The important
consequence that comes through in Figure 3 is that year-over-year changes in aver-
age household electricity consumption are basically all weather, absent a change in
prices. It is the stability of this tight relationship over time that we rely upon to draw
inferences about how households responded to subsequent crisis-related events.
22Note that weather during the two crisis-period years (2000-01) falls within the range of variation
observed during the ﬁtted stable-price period (1998-99); see Table 2.
195 The Price Spike and Price Cap During 2000
We now describe our empirical ﬁndings on households’ responses to the summer 2000
price spike and subsequent price cap. Our discussion proceeds in two parts: the ﬁrst
summarizes and interprets the main statistical results, and the second addresses their
implications.
5.1 Main Results
Figure 4 describes households’ average consumption responses to the crisis in the sum-
mer and fall of 2000. For comparison, we also provide the same information for 1999
and the spring of 2000, prior to the crisis. The solid line shown is the pooled diﬀerence
estimator  D
p
cm in (4), calculated relative to households’ 1998 and 1999 consumption
levels. This statistic, which varies (nearly) daily, is non-parametrically smoothed
slightly for clarity.23 The line represents the average within-household change in elec-
tricity consumption from the same month of prior years, after subtracting the change
in consumption predicted by pre-crisis trend and weather alone.
During the stable-price period, the line shown in Figure 4 is eﬀectively zero. This
much is to be expected from Figure 3. The small ﬂuctuations of the line during
1999 and the ﬁrst-half of 2000 are (primarily) attributable to unmeasured factors
that inﬂuence same-month changes in average electricity demand from one year to
the next (such as unusual weather patterns as in March 2000, noted earlier). The
absolute error represented by these ﬂuctuations is typically about one percent, which
is small compared to the changes to come in mid-2000.
The data in Figure 4 reveal an abrupt change in household electricity use during
the summer of 2000. From mid-July on, average residential electricity consumption
begins a precipitous decline. Table 4 provides a numerical summary of these changes
along with information on average prices. By the end of summer 2000, San Diego’s
million households consumed 12 to 13 % less electricity than in prior years, net of
the eﬀects of weather and adjusted for trend. Table 4 also shows that although
consumers faced dramatically higher prices in July, their consumption over the prior
23Here and throughout we use a standard loess (locally-estimated scatter plot smoothing) pro-
cedure with a narrow bandwidth to present time-series results. This procedure reduces sampling
variability and variation due to the composition of bills that close on a particular day (i.e., billing-
cohort eﬀects). Billing-cohort variation is due to SDG&E’s geographically-rotating meter-reading
schedule.
20month did not appear to anticipate these higher prices. The decline in consumption
is ﬁrst evident toward the end of July – a full month after prices began their rapid
rise. Given that bills reﬂect consumption over the preceding 30 or so days, Table 4
implies a 12 to 13 % drop in consumption occurred in a short span of about 60 days.
Figure 4 further reveals that the decline in average consumption ends nearly as
abruptly as it began. This change is ﬁrst observed in bills closing in September,
which implies that households began to reverse course in their consumption behavior
conceivably as early as late August. Figure 4 and Table 4 then show a rapid rise in
average consumption from late September through October. This eﬀect is coincident
with the imposition of the (retroactive) price cap in early September. We refer to
this as the rebound eﬀect. The slight decline that follows the fall 2000 consumption
rebound, evident for December in Figure 4, fore-shadows another change in house-
holds’ consumption behavior as the electricity crisis escalated during winter 2000 and
early 2001.
Interpreting Response Magnitudes
The electricity consumption changes shown in Figure 4 and Table 4 present a rea-
sonably compelling case that San Diego-area households responded to the abrupt rise
and subsequent fall in electricity prices during 2000. Moreover, they did so fairly
rapidly. In order to grasp the implications of these results, it is important to address
ﬁrst a question of interpretation: Is a 12 to 13% drop in electricity consumption a
big response, or a small one?
A 12 to 13% percent reduction in electricity use requires a non-trivial behavioral
change for most households. It involves not turning on air conditioners or raising
temperature settings substantially, re-setting pool ﬁlters to operate far fewer hours,
dramatically reducing television time, or other such actions. To have a sense of the
magnitudes involved, appliance-level electricity consumption data from San Diego in-
dicate that air conditioning accounts for about 15% of aggregate residential electricity
consumption during the summer.24 Only steep reductions in air conditioner use could
therefore account for the observed 12 to 13% drop in aggregate residential electricity
consumption—and this during a relatively warm summer. Alternatively (or in combi-
24Derived from EPRI (1989) Table 3-4, which is based on appliance sub-metering studies of San
Diego households performed by SDG&E.
21nation), changes in other appliances’ use would have to be substantial. For example,
if households reduced their aggregate use of electric clothes dryers by one-half (by
substituting to clothes lines), electric stoves and ovens by one-half (by changing the
foods they prepare or dining elsewhere), dishwashers by one-half (ibid), home lighting
by one-third, and additionally cut television time by one-half, then combined these
ﬁve changes could amount to a 10% reduction in average electricity consumption.25
One can continue with similar such examples for less electricity-intensive appliances,
but the picture here is clear. Because a large share of San Diegans’ aggregate resi-
dential electricity consumption is attributable to appliances for which consumption
cannot be easily changed in the short-run (most importantly refrigerators, freezers,
and electric water heaters), substantial changes must have taken place in how often
the other major appliances are used.
Additionally, households could also respond by replacing aging and ineﬃcient
appliances with newer, more-energy eﬃcient ones. There is evidence of this from con-
temporaneous secondary sources (appliance sales data, press accounts, and surveys).
Telephone interviews with a sample of 400 SDG&E-area households by Lutzenhiser
(2002) indicate that 1 in 8 report purchasing and replacing a major appliance with a
more eﬃcient model during the electricity crisis. The net eﬀect of these longer-term
actions with respect to electricity consumption are discussed further below. Here
we note that these actions represent a substantial behavioral response of a diﬀerent
sort, inasmuch as the expenditures involved may represent primarily foregone con-
sumption of other goods and services. Replacing any electricity-intensive durable
appliance in the home (e.g., air conditioner, refrigerator, water heater, dishwasher, or
clothes dryer) is an expensive outlay, even in comparison to the electricity savings at
San Diegans’ summer 2000 electricity prices.26
Heterogeneity of Responses
There is, of course, a great deal of heterogeneity in households’ consumption responses
to what was (essentially) an identical price change for all consumers. Figure 5 shows
25Based on appliance-level electricity consumption and utilization data from the U.S. Department
of Energy (EIA (1997), Table 3.1).
26There is also the issue of to what extent the price increases simply accelerated replacement of
durables that would have soon been replaced anyway. Unfortunately, this question is not easily
assessed.
22the cross-sectional distribution of individual households’ consumption changes be-
tween August 1999 and August 2000. For comparison the ﬁgure also shows the
distribution of households’ consumption changes between August 1998 and August
1999, when no appreciable price changes occurred. The two distributions are based
on each household’s adjusted (net) consumption change, which is the actual change
less the change predicted by pre-crisis trend and weather alone.
The distribution for 1999-to-2000 shows extraordinary variance, with a substan-
tial number of households exhibiting consumption changes at the extremes in both
directions. On the right, there is a substantial share of the population who actually
increased consumption from August 1999 to August 2000, net of weather and (pre-
crisis) trend. This group comprises approximately 36% of households, which is down
from 50% during the prior years’ comparison period. This magnitude is in line with
prior econometric work using diﬀerent data that indicates approximately 2/5ths of
the California population are completely price-inelastic electricity users (see Reiss and
White (2001)). As a practical matter, these ﬁndings suggest that roughly one-third
of the population would exhibit no observable consumption decrease in response to
even large changes in electricity prices.
On the opposite end, there is a large share of households that show dramatic
reductions in electricity consumption. Between August 1999 and August 2000, ap-
proximately 1 in 3 households reduced electricity use by 20% or more (again, relative
to pre-crisis trend and adjusted for weather). For the prior years’ period of August
1998 to 1999, the directly comparable ﬁgure is only 1 in 14 households. Thus, a sub-
stantial share of the decline in average (and aggregate) consumption is attributable
to a minority of the population who reduced their electricity use dramatically during
the summer of 2000. Consumption reductions of 20% or more require careful and
attentive eﬀorts to lower electricity use, major investments in new appliances, or sub-
stitution behaviors that one suspects would pose considerable inconvenience within
the household.
Figure 6 provides additional information on the heterogeneity in consumers’ be-
haviors during California’s electricity crisis. It shows the percent change in house-
holds’ electricity consumption between August 2000 and August of prior years, again
adjusted for weather and relative to pre-crisis trend, versus households’ consumption
levels (in kilowatt-hours) for August 1999. Each point in the scatter is an individual
23household.27 The solid line in the ﬁgure is the (non-parametric) line of averages,
which shows the mean consumption response at each level of consumption. Average
household consumption for August 1999 is 498 KWh.
A striking aspect of Figure 6 is the enormous variance in year-over-year consump-
tion changes across households, at all consumption levels. This variance—recall it
is already net of weather’s inﬂuence—is precisely why it is diﬃcult to estimate the
sensitivity of electricity demand to small price changes. Such price changes are the
nature of the historical data upon which most econometric studies are based. Despite
this dispersion in consumption responses, however, it is clear that the change at the
mean is negative here (as summarized in Figure 4). By comparison, a similar scatter
plot (not shown here) of August 1998 to 1999 changes versus August 1998 levels—
an interval when no appreciable price changes occurred—shows no such change. In
that case, the weather- and trend-adjusted consumption changes are nearly perfectly
symmetrically distributed about zero at all consumption levels.
5.2 Discussion
The results in Figures 4 through 6 speak to issues of broader signiﬁcance for energy
markets and regulatory policies. It is perhaps not surprising to many economists that
households would adjust their electricity consumption in response to price changes
even over short-term durations. But this fact has not been widely recognized by
policy-makers, in part because clear and unambiguous evidence of such behavior has
been heretofore lacking. The results above indicate that consumers have considerable
control over the short-run electricity use of their household appliances, and are willing
to modify that use in response to pecuniary incentives.
In post-mortem analyses of electricity market problems in California and else-
where, the sensitivity of demand to price signals has become a central focus of re-
forms. Numerous observers have noted the insensitivity of electricity demand to
the actual cost of producing power at any point in time (Borenstein (2002), Joskow
(2001), Wolak (2003)). As these authors point out, however, the diagnosis that de-
mand is nearly perfectly inelastic with respect to the wholesale price of power (San
Diego being a brief exception) need not reﬂect consumer preferences. Rather, it more
likely reﬂects the tenuous link between the naturally volatile price of electricity on
27Figure 6 clips a small fraction of households whose consumption exceeds 1500 KWh per month.
24wholesale commodity markets and the average-cost-based retail electricity prices em-
ployed by state utility regulators. This observation has led to a variety of proposals
for reforming retail pricing mechanisms to improve demand responsiveness and thus
market eﬃciency (such as real-time pricing, critical-peak pricing, or more widespread
use of time-of-day pricing; see Laﬀerty et al. (2001) or CPUC (2002)). The principal
unknown confronting these proposals is whether consumers—households, especially—
are actually willing and able to forgo electricity consumption over short-term horizons.
The data from San Diego lend considerable credence to the view that consumers—
or at least a large share of them—would react to such programs by changing their
consumption behavior substantially whenever prices do.
Nevertheless, we caution against directly interpreting these results as classical
demand elasticities. It is tempting to divide the August 2000 drop in average demand
by the contemporaneous percent change in prices from Figure 1, and declare the
ratio a price elasticity of demand. We have not done so, as this is likely to be
misleading if applied uncritically in other circumstances. Electricity consumption
was still falling precipitously at the time the price cap was imposed, ending the
unintended ‘experiment’ in demand sensitivity before consumer adjustment to these
prices had stabilized at a new consumption level. This limitation means we cannot
construe the consumption drop here as a complete adjustment to the price change,
which is the assumption implicit in economists’ customary use and interpretation of
price elasticities. At best, one can interpret the results here as informing the 60-day
elasticity (or so) of residential electricity demand with respect to an unanticipated
increase (roughly doubling) in price.
Marginal Valuations
An important related observation about consumers’ willingness-to-pay can be derived
from these results. The magnitude of San Diego households’ average electricity con-
sumption response is all the more remarkable when one considers that the typical
monetary savings achieved is rather small. The median household reduction in elec-
tricity consumption during August 2000, after adjustment for weather and relative to
pre-crisis trend, is 44 kilowatt-hours in physical terms. This is about 9% of average
pre-crisis consumption. At then-prevailing electricity prices, reducing demand by 44
KWh would lower a household’s total expenditures by approximately $10.25.
This amount seems a small income gain for implementing a 9% decrease in house-
25hold electricity use, particularly given our earlier discussion. Since this magnitude
of an income-electricity use trade-oﬀ was in fact made—by half of a population of
1.1 million San Diego households—it strikes us that the data show consumers are re-
markably willing to forgo electricity consumption for comparatively paltry monetary
amounts. In other words, the marginal value of the last 5% or so of aggregate residen-
tial electricity consumption each month must be low—on the order of $10.25× 1
2 1.1
million in the aggregate, or about $5.12 per household on average.
Eﬀects of the Price Cap
Figure 4 shows that after the price cap was imposed in the fall of 2000, average
electricity consumption quickly rebounded upward. This rapid reversal might not be
considered surprising, given the rate at which consumers reduced demand when prices
rose during the summer. Average household consumption increased approximately
7% between mid-September and mid-October, on a weather-adjusted basis. As the
evidence from earlier in 2000 showed, consumers clearly react—here with less than a
one month lag—to changes in their electricity prices.
One feature to note here is that the response to the price cap in the fall of 2000 was
surely inﬂuenced, to some extent, by its retroactive provision. Billing credits issued
in the fall of 2000 refunded summer electricity charges in excess of the new price
cap. For many households, these credits made electricity bills in September through
November net to zero. An inattentive consumer might have observed and reacted to
only this bill total, rather than the positive marginal price (capped at roughly 13.5
cents per KWh) during this period.
It is also noteworthy that the consumption rebound amounts to only about two-
thirds of the decline that occurred during the price spike. If simply foregoing con-
sumption (i.e., not turning on appliances) accounted for all of households’ summer
2000 behavioral responses, one might expect a complete rebound in the fall. The de-
mand rebound following the price cap leaves average consumption about four percent
below its pre-spike level, however, and it remains at that level (on a weather-adjusted
basis) throughout that fall.
One interpretation of this fact is that it suggests that approximately one-third of
consumers’ aggregate response to the price spike was realized through changes in ap-
pliance stocks, dwelling improvements, or persistent changes in utilization decisions.
This gives some quantitative credence to the self-reported evidence on appliance re-
26placement from Lutzenhiser (2002), noted above. Moreover, during all of 2001 and
into 2002, demand (net weather eﬀects) never rises above the level evident immedi-
ately following the price cap’s imposition. The implication is even transitory price
spikes, if not pre-announced (as would generally be the case) appear to have measur-
able long-term impacts on energy demand.
6 Post-Cap Interventions
6.1 Public Appeals and Crisis Attention
Although San Diego consumers’ electricity prices were capped throughout 2001, prices
on California’s wholesale electricity market continued to escalate dramatically in De-
cember 2000 and January 2001 (see again Figure 1). The fact that wholesale elec-
tricity prices exceeded retail prices by a substantial margin led California’s regulated
utilities to the brink of insolvency. An ensuing credit crisis further exacerbated the
ineﬃciency problems in the wholesale market, leading the state into a true (physi-
cal) electricity supply crisis during the winter of 2000 and spring of 2001. In fact, a
limited number of consumers experienced involuntary ‘rolling blackouts’ (electricity
rationing, in eﬀect) during January, March, and again in May of 2001.
During these winter and early spring months, state oﬃcials made dramatic tele-
vised appeals for consumers to voluntarily conserve electricity. The deepening crisis
was routinely aired on nightly news programs in California (and nationally), partic-
ularly following the realization of rolling blackouts to homes and businesses. Nev-
ertheless, state leaders feared a widespread—and well-founded—political backlash if
consumers’ electricity prices were to increase commensurate with wholesale markets’.
State utility regulators refused to allow essentially any change in retail electricity
prices throughout this period.28 Residential prices in San Diego, in particular, con-
tinued at the capped level shown in Figure 1 throughout the spring, summer, and
early fall of 2001. A variety of conservation programs and incentives also were put
in place in early 2001, but these programs were not primarily aimed at residential
28The state’s public utilities commission approved a one cent per KWh increase in prices for two
of the states’ utilities (serving areas other than San Diego) in January of 2001. This ‘emergency’
measure was little more than a token political maneuver by regulators to signal awareness of the
looming cash-ﬂow crisis to utilities’ creditors; substantive changes in prices did not occur until June
of 2001 for these two utilities, and not until November 2001 for the utility serving San Diego.
27customers.
Did these (non-price) events—media attention to the crisis and oﬃcials’ public
appeals for voluntary electricity conservation—alter households’ consumption? Stan-
dard economic theory suggests that given prices were capped at a constant level,
consumers would have little incentive to reduce individual consumption. The empiri-
cal evidence suggests that the opposite was the case: there was, in fact, a substantial
response by California households to these events.
Figure 7 presents the main evidence on this point. This ﬁgure extends the time-
series shown in Figure 4 into 2001. As earlier, the line shows the average change
in consumption from corresponding months of the pre-crisis period, net the eﬀects
of weather and relative to pre-crisis trend.29 Figure 7 shows a steady and sizable
continuous reduction in household electricity consumption from January through May
2001. This decline amounts to approximately 6% of average pre-crisis consumption,
on a weather-adjusted basis. Interestingly, the two largest drops (in late-January to
February bills and mid-March to early-April bills) occur following two sets of limited,
but well-publicized, rolling-blackouts in mid-January and mid-March. The second set
aﬀected approximately 41 thousand customers in the San Diego region.
That consumption dropped substantially when prices were not changing is im-
portant for several reasons. Public appeals for energy conservation by government
oﬃcials have a long history in times of energy crises, to questionable eﬀect. In eco-
nomic terms, voluntary energy conservation is a collective-action problem that is
subject to seemingly extreme free-rider diﬃculties. Factually, the probability an in-
dividual household could aﬀect the aggregate supply-demand electricity balance in a
grid the size of a major California city is inﬁnitesimally small. Moreover, there is no
real way for others to know whether a particular household is conserving electricity
or not—even among immediate neighbors. One cannot readily check a neighboring
household’s indoor air temperature, daily hot-water use, or other major appliances.
Thus, explanations that rely upon a household’s desire not to be seen as a proﬂigate
29We make one important adjust to our prior methods here. Because personal income growth
had begun to slow by the beginning of 2001 (see again Section 4), it is possible that households’
secular trend in electricity consumption would have slowed from the pre-crisis rates estimated in
Table 3. Consequently, we constructed Figure 7 assuming that there was zero secular consumption
growth after January 2001. We view this assumption as highly conservative, since assuming positive
growth (the historical norm) would result in greater estimated consumption decreases and electricity
consumption is highly income-inelastic. One can visually adjust the line in Figure 7 proportionately
for an alternative trend growth-rate assumption.
28user by others face a basic problem: one’s eﬀort to reduce electricity consumption—or
not—is (essentially) visible only to that household.
Despite these features and the absence of any change in pecuniary incentives, how-
ever, households collectively responded dramatically to the media attention and pub-
lic appeals for electricity conservation during this period. The nature of individuals’
free-rider problem here and the lack of private incentives for electricity conservation
leave largely ‘moral suasion’-type arguments to explain their behavior: Consumers
individually wanting to ‘do their part’ to mitigate the electricity crisis, et cetera.30
Although economists tend to be dismissive of public appeals than run contrary to
private incentives when free-rider problems are great, one cannot dismiss the striking
reduction in average household electricity consumption shown in Figure 7. The em-
pirical facts here indicate that consumers do respond to voluntary appeals to modify
their consumption behavior, provided (1) the costs of a collective-action failure are
tangible (here, involuntary blackouts for some consumers), and (2) media attention
to the problem is considerable.
6.2 The Conservation Price-Rebate Program
In the spring of 2001, California faced the prospect of more frequent electricity short-
ages and continuing wholesale market problems during the coming summer. One
major policy response was a novel voluntary conservation rebate program for the
summer of 2001. In the San Diego region, this program oﬀered each household a 20%
rebate against its monthly electricity bill (via a line-item bill credit) if the house-
hold reduced its electricity use by 15% or more from the same month of 2000. This
program was promoted as a “cash for energy savings” program, with the program’s
cost paid from the state’s general revenue. Although similar rebate programs had
been tried on smaller scales, this program appears to be the ﬁrst large-scale eﬀort to
pay households for reducing their consumption. As such, it was followed by industry
participants with great interest.
30It is also possible consumers believed that by reducing their consumption individually, they
could reduce the chance of future involuntary blackouts. Although this is diﬃcult to assess directly,
Lutzenhiser (2002, Table 18) reports that among households surveyed in the Southern California
Edison service area during 2001, 30% claimed to have experienced a blackout ordered by the elec-
tricity system operators. The actual number is closer to ﬁve percent. Californians evidently viewed
their blackouts as widespread, although they directly aﬀected relatively few.
29Before the program was implemented, there was some controversy about whether
it would alter consumers’ behavior. First, industry experts worried that the rebate
threshold was not sensitive to potential weather diﬀerences between 2000 and 2001.
Thus a cooler summer in 2001, as actually occurred, would make it possible for a
household to receive a rebate without changing its behavior from what would have
occurred without the program.31 Second, there is the issue that large reductions in
average household electricity use had already occurred, absent any price changes,
during the spring of 2001 (as shown in Figure 7, above). This fact makes aggregate
tabulations of year-over-year consumption changes between the summers of 2000 to
2001, as reported in Goldman et al. (2002) and others, diﬃcult to interpret.
Table 5 and Figure 7 present information that disentangles these factors. The
ﬁrst column of Table 5 shows the fraction of all San Diego-area households that
qualiﬁed for a rebate by reducing consumption 15% or more from the same month of
2000. For comparison, we also provide the corresponding ﬁgures for pre- and post-
program months when no rebates were oﬀered. The data indicate that on average
about 39% of residential bills qualiﬁed for a rebate during the program months of
June through September.32 The average rebate amounted to $11. When we examine
the distribution of consumption changes, there is no clustering of accounts on either
side of 15%—that is, we do not observe a disproportionate number of accounts just
qualifying for the rebate, nor just missing the rebate threshold.
The second column of Table 5 shows the fraction of households that would have
qualiﬁed for a rebate in the absence of consumption decreases attributable to weather
alone. We obtain these ﬁgures by calculating, separately for each household and
each month, the actual consumption change between 2000 and 2001 less the change
attributable to weather and trend alone. The June through September average is four
percent below the unadjusted average in the ﬁrst column, suggesting that the weather
had a modest impact on the fraction of households that qualiﬁed. Only in August
does the weather appear to have greatly aided households’ chances of qualifying.
31One manager for Southern California Edison noted in late 2001, “I got a 20 percent rebate during
the summer and I did absolutely nothing. I just never had to turn on my air conditioner.” (Chan
(2001)).
32According to CPUC (2002b), approximately 36% of SDG&E residential customers qualiﬁed for
a rebate. The report is unclear as to how this ﬁgure is computed. The same report states that
total rebate expenditures in the SDG&E service area were $16 million. Our data imply aggregate
SDG&E-issued rebates of $18 million.
30The ﬁnal two columns of Table 5 provide information about the aggregate eﬀect of
the program on household consumption. Column (3) shows households that qualiﬁed
for a rebate reduced consumption by 35% relative to the same months of pre-crisis
years, adjusted for weather and net of trend. Overall, column (4) shows the aggregate
eﬀect for all households was (understandably) smaller, with average household con-
sumption during program months typically 11 to 14% below what we would expect
on the basis of consumption behavior prior to the crisis.
To gauge the program’s direct eﬀect, however, it is important to make compar-
isons across diﬀerent months in the rows of Table 5. These show that in April and
May 2001, prior to the program’s commencement, average household consumption
ran 8 to 9% below comparable pre-crisis levels; this increased to 11% in June, then
13 to 14% for July though September. Thus we view the best estimate of this pro-
gram’s overall consumption impact as the decrement from spring pre-program levels,
or approximately 4 to 6% of average pre-crisis household consumption.
The important point to note here is that, despite wide (and ultimately legitimate)
concerns about this program’s potential free-rider problem, it evidently did reduce
average household consumption signiﬁcantly. A consumption reduction of 4 to 6% is a
big eﬀect, particularly given it was incremental to an 8 to 9% decrease from pre-crisis
consumption levels prior to the program’s start. Much as we have suggested that the
12 to 13% decrease in average consumption during the price spike of 2000 required
substantial practical changes in how households use their appliances, it appears that
households were again willing and able to make similar-magnitude changes in response
to a combination of pecuniary and non-pecuniary incentives during 2001.
In contrast to the price spike, however, the eﬀects of these voluntary conservation
programs appear transitory. Figure 7 shows that average household consumption
increased dramatically in late September and October 2001, after the conservation
rebate program ended. (The state’s broader media campaign had eﬀectively ended by
this time as well). Consumption in October 2001 through March 2002, which is the
end of our sample data, averages approximately 6% below pre-crisis levels. This is far
above the average 13% below pre-crisis level during the rebate program in Table 5.
The consumption increase in the fall of 2001 exceeds the magnitude of the program’s
eﬀect, reversing much of the consumption decline in the spring of 2001 during the
height of media attention to the crisis. In short, while the unannounced price spike
in 2000 had a persistent but small eﬀect after the price spike was rescinded (see again
31the price cap eﬀect discussion in Section 5.2), it seems clear the eﬀects of the two
voluntary energy conservation programs were largely transitory.
Program Cost Estimates
Another perspective on consumption behavior during the conservation rebate pro-
gram is from the viewpoint of program cost eﬀectiveness. Table 6 estimates how
much the state eﬀectively “paid” for reductions in household electricity consumption
during summer 2001. We use the household-level estimates of electricity consumption
changes underlying the ﬁgures the ﬁnal column of Table 5 to calculate the program’s
cost eﬀectiveness.
Column (1) in Table 6 shows the average value of the rebate paid to households
that qualiﬁed for it, by program month. Column (2) reports the fraction of households
that qualiﬁed, as shown in Table 5. We then report two measures of the change in
household electricity consumption during program months. Column (3) is the average
consumption change in KWh for all households, relative to the same months of pre-
crisis years (1998 and 1999) adjusted for weather and trend. This statistic reveals the
cumulative reduction in average household electricity consumption relative to pre-
crisis behavior. (The time-series behavior of this statistic is shown in more detail
in Figure 7). The program-eﬀect column (4) is calculated beginning with the value
in column (3) but then deducting the average reduction in consumption (relative
to the pre-crisis period) already achieved in the neighboring non-rebate months of
April, May, October and November. Column (4) is interpretable as the incremental
reduction in average consumption during program months.
The ﬁnal column in Table 6 reports program cost estimates, calculated as the ratio
of the total rebates paid to the incremental reduction in average consumption during
program months. These are probably the most accurate estimates available for the
average cost to the state of California of its conservation rebate program (excluding
administrative costs) on a dollars-per-“KWh saved” basis.33 T h eﬁ g u r e sh e r ei n d i c a t e
that the program’s average cost (in cents per KWH) was above the average price
of electricity to consumers at the time, as expected. Nevertheless, these ﬁgures are
below the average price of power on wholesale markets during the spring of 2001,
33These calculations ignore the administrative costs of running the program. We have been unable
to obtain program administrative cost data.
32when the program was developed.
Of broader interest, however, is the fact that the magnitude of consumers’ re-
sponses to this incentive program are not dissimilar to their behavior during the
price spike one year earlier. In the aggregate, the incremental reduction in monthly
consumption during the rebate program amounted to approximately 24 KWh per
household. This reduction lowered average household electricity expenditures by ap-
proximately $4.30 per household. By comparison, the 12% average household con-
sumption reduction during the price spike corresponds to approximately 62 KWh, for
an average expenditure savings of $13.70. While comparisons of these ﬁgures reﬂect
consumer average, rather than marginal, willingness to pay, the ratio of aggregate
expenditure “savings” to electricity consumption foregone are in line with one an-
other: $0.18 per KWh for the rebate program and $0.22 per KWh during the price
spike. This is notable because both programs, although diﬀerent in economic struc-
ture, provide similar measures of consumers’ aggregate willingness to substitute away
from electricity use given a pecuniary incentive to do so.
7 Conclusion
This paper analyzes unique household-level electricity consumption data during a
period when households saw unprecedented retail price changes and were subject
to notable conservation programs. Our results are relevant to energy policy discus-
sions and also to economic questions about whether and how a large population of
consumers might react to short-term price and non-price incentives to modify con-
sumption behavior.
Our ﬁndings are of particular interest to debates about the merits of reforming
retail electricity pricing—especially those that envision making prices more responsive
to the short-term balance of electricity supply and demand. These proposals vary from
having “real-time” prices, where a consumer’s price might vary hourly, to proposals
that change consumers’ prices over longer windows (on a day’s notice, at set times
each day, et cetera). The beneﬁts of such ﬂexible pricing systems depend critically on
consumers’ willingness to curtail electricity consumption in response to high prices;
absent a signiﬁcant consumer behavioral response, such proposals incur costs with
little eﬃciency gains. At present, policy-makers have limited direct evidence on how
a large and diverse population of residential consumers might respond under such
33proposals (see CPUC (2002)). Unfortunately, this makes it diﬃcult to dissuade the
view that consumers do not (or cannot) respond to electricity price changes at all. As
recently as April 2002, economist and former Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
commissioner Charles Stalon, speaking about the San Diego summer 2000 price spike,
remarked “[We still] can’t say whether we saw any signiﬁcant response on the demand
side or not.”34
The data from San Diego examined in this paper present compelling evidence
to the contrary: Average household consumption fell twelve percent over a short
span of approximately sixty days, in response to an unannounced price increase.
To be clear, our results are only suggestive (at best) of what might happen if price
changes of this magnitude were promulgated or scheduled diﬀerently, or changed with
greater frequency. Nevertheless, the evidence from San Diego shown here should be
suﬃcient to dissipate (at least in principle) any lingering views among policy-makers
that consumers do not respond to short-run electricity price changes.
Two aspects of our results also carry noteworthy policy implications. The extraor-
dinary heterogeneity in consumers’ responses to the price spike surely reﬂects both
variation in households’ marginal valuations of electricity, and heterogeneity in how
much attention people pay to electricity prices, their bills, and energy use. The data
suggest most of the aggregate consumption decline we observed was attributable to
a small share of all households. This fact suggests a cost-eﬀective way of introducing
new pricing mechanisms for making supply and demand adjust more eﬃciently is to
identify these price-responsive consumers from the data, and target the new pricing
system accordingly.
The ﬁndings regarding California’s initiatives to reduce consumption during 2001
are also of interest. California’s eﬀort to alter individual consumption behavior, par-
ticularly through media attention, has provoked considerable attention because strate-
gies that successfully reduce electricity use without directly taxing it (or otherwise
raising price) are of great interest to energy and environmental policy makers. We
ﬁnd that San Diego-area households did reduce their consumption signiﬁcantly dur-
ing the height of the state’s energy crisis and public pleas for energy conservation. In
contrast to consumer’s responses to price changes, however, the eﬀect of such appeals
proved transitory.
34Hand (2002), p. 16.
34Appendix A. Entry and Attrition Bias Corrections
Our sample of n = 70,000 residential billing accounts was drawn by simple random
sampling from the roughly 1 million SDG&E residential electric accounts in March
2001. The entry or attrition of approximately one thousand sample accounts per
month before and after that date poses both standard and non-standard statistical
issues. Little and Rubin (2002) provide a detailed discussion of statistical methods
designed to correct for attrition in longitudinal data.
A conventional approach to correcting for the eﬀect of attrition is to adjust the
uniform random-sample weights for non-uniform attrition. For example, suppose
there were ncm households in cohort c in the original sample of 70,000 households.
If we had ncm households in every month m, we would estimate cohort c’s month m
population average electricity consumption by
ncm
i=1 ωicmyicm,w h e r eyicm is household
i’s consumption in month m and ωicm =1 /ncm. In our case, with the exceptions
of February and March 2001, we observe consumption for n∗
cm <n cm households.









where φicm is the probability household i in cohort c is not missing in month m.
To compute these sampling weights, one needs to estimate the attrition probabilities
φicm. This is typically done by estimating a discrete dependent variable model for
the probability that an observation is missing. We follow this approach.
We ﬁrst matched our sample households to Census 2000 census tracts so that we
could obtain demographic and other information that would help predict when we
would lose a household from the sample. We match each account to its census tract
using the account service address’ nine-digit zip-code from the HERBS data.35 A
2000 Census tract in the San Diego MSA contains approximately 1,600 households.
We model an observation as missing or non-missing using a probit speciﬁcation.
The covariates that predict the likelihood of an observation being missing are: indica-
tor variables for the decile into which the household’s average electricity consumption
falls in February 2001, an indicator for whether the household has natural gas service,
an indicator whether the household is on a low-income electricity tariﬀ, an indicator
for whether the account-holder is an SDG&E employee, an indicator for whether the
household’s electric service as billed by a third-party when that option was available,
the fraction of households renting in the account’s census tract, the median age of
household heads in the account’s census tract, the median household income in the
account’s census tract, the median number of rooms per housing unit in the account’s
35For a few, mostly ex-urban accounts, we do not have the last four zip code digits and instead
map the account to a central town Census tract.
35census tract, the fraction of housing units that are detached single-family dwellings
units in the account’s census tract, the fraction housing units with natural gas heating
in the account’s census tract, the median structure age in the account’s census tract,
the fraction of population that is urban in the account’s census tract, and the median
house value in the account’s census tract.
Our estimated probit coeﬃcients vary by time. In practice, this means we estimate
a separate missing-observation probit model for each cohort-month (i.e., each end
billing date) in our sample. This yields a total of nearly 1000 probit models. Thus, the
entry/attrition modeling is quite ﬂexible in that we allow the eﬀect of a household’s
covariates to vary by cohort and by calendar month.36
While it is not easy to summarize the many-thousand probit coeﬃcient estimates,
the results primarily accord with intuition. Most of the afore-mentioned covariates
are statistically signiﬁcant predictors of missing observations. For example, a greater
fraction of renters in the census tract is associated with a higher chance of missing
data. Similarly, accounts in lower consumption deciles are signiﬁcantly more likely to
have missing account information as one moves backward and forward from March
2001. As noted in the text, we ﬁnd that adjusting for these eﬀects signiﬁcantly
impacts inferences about consumption levels but does not appreciably alter average
year-over-year consumption change measures.
In constructing our entry-/attrition-bias correction weightings, we estimate sep-
arate models for the availability of data on levels and the availability of data in
twelve-month diﬀerences used in the regression analyses. Thus, we calculate separate
weights for reporting averages of consumption levels and averages of consumption
changes. The need for these weights arises because late-stage entrants into the sam-
ple (row (3) in Table 1) are treated as missing for purposes of the regression analyses,
but are not missing when computing average consumption levels (reported in Table
2).
36Because the probits are estimated by day, each probit is for approximately 2600-4000 households
whose bills closed (or, absent attrition, would have closed) on a particular day.
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38Table 1
Sample Information, Entry, and Attrition
(Standard deviations in parentheses)
Average Consumption
Growth (in percent) b Average
Kilowatt-hours
Sample Number of Consumed, March 1999 March 2001
Condition Households March 2001 a to March 2000 to March 2002
Total households sampled, 70,000 473 4.3 −4.4
March 2001 (sample draw date) (67) (6.2) (5.4)
Households observed beginning:
(1) October 1997 37,872 514 3.0 −5.2
(sample start date) (73) (5.6) (5.6)
(2) Between Oct. 1997 7,428 460 6.5 −3.5
and Dec. 1998 (entrants) (60) (6.1) (6.3)
(3) Between Dec. 1998 24,700 415 n.a. c −2.3
and March 2001 (entrants) (58) (3.6)
Households observed until:
(4) Between March 2001 14,034 399 4.5 n.a. c
and April 2002 (attrition) (56) (6.8)
(5) April 2002 55,966 492 4.3 −4.0
(sample end date) (70) (6.1) (5.2)
Notes. The sample extends from October 1997 to April 2002. Available billing histories start
at October 1997 if the household began electric service before this date, and end at April 2002
if the household continued service after this date.
aAverage household consumption for the March 2001 billing period, normalized to 30 days.
bGrowth rates expressed as a percent of average consumption in March 2001.
cNot applicable. This ﬁgure cannot be calculated for these households.Table 2
San Diego Region Summer Weather
and Electricity Consumption, 1998-2001
Billing-Month 1998 1999 2000 2001
Monthly Cooling Degree-Daysa
June 15 20 76 59
July 137 127 153 158
August 261 153 250 168
September 277 126 207 164
October 82 142 123 121
All 12 months 797 654 857 735
Average Daily Electricity Consumption
(per household, in kilowatt-hours)
June 13.7 14.2 15.4 13.3
July 15.1 15.6 16.2 14.2
August 18.2 16.5 17.0 14.5
September 19.3 16.3 16.2 15.1
October 14.9 16.0 15.4 14.7
All 12 months 16.0 16.1 16.1 15.0
Notes: Figures reported are averages over households for
bills ending in the month shown (see text).
aMonthly cooling degree-days measure the number of
degrees by which the average daily air temperature exceeds
65°F, summed over the course of a month.Table 3
Summary Estimation Results for the Stable-Price Period
Distribution of Parameter Estimates Across Households
Percentiles
Coeﬃcient Units Mean Std. Error 25th 50th 75th
Raw Parameter Estimates
Constant, Pre-10/99 ∆kwh / day 0.69 (0.13) −0.70 0.38 1.78
Constant, Post-10/99 ∆kwh / day 0.50 (0.06) −0.98 0.35 1.93
Heating, Winter ∆kwh / ∆hdd 0.21 (0.01) −0.19 0.10 0.50
Heating, Spring/Fall ∆kwh / ∆hdd 0.19 (0.01) −0.18 0.10 0.46
Cooling, Summer ∆kwh / ∆cdd 0.76 (0.04) −0.04 0.34 1.22
Cooling, Spring/Fall ∆kwh / ∆cdd 0.47 (0.04) −0.22 0.21 0.92
Adjusted R2 0.35 0.10 0.39 0.64
Entry-/Attrition-Adjusted Estimates a
Constant, Pre-10/99 ∆kwh / day 0.64 (0.12) −0.66 0.35 1.65
Constant, Post-10/99 ∆kwh / day 0.45 (0.05) −0.92 0.31 1.78
Heating, Winter ∆kwh / ∆hdd 0.20 (0.01) −0.18 0.09 0.48
Heating, Spring/Fall ∆kwh / ∆hdd 0.18 (0.00) −0.17 0.09 0.43
Cooling, Summer ∆kwh / ∆cdd 0.71 (0.04) −0.05 0.31 1.10
Cooling, Spring/Fall ∆kwh / ∆cdd 0.44 (0.03) −0.22 0.19 0.85
Interpretable Eﬀects (Using Adjusted Estimates)
Trend Consumption Growth
Pre-10/99 % / year 3.27 −5.48 2.99 12.11
Post-10/99 % / year 2.50 −7.58 2.77 13.34
Consumption Elasticity with Respect to Weather
In Summer (per %∆cdd ) 0.31 −0.03 0.18 0.63
In Winter (per %∆hdd ) 0.11 −0.10 0.05 0.26
Notes. Summary results for 46,783 individual household regressions. The dependent variable
is the household’s change in average daily electricity consumption, in kilowatt-hours, for the
same billing-month between two consecutive years (i.e., 12-month diﬀerences). Not all
regressions estimate a pre-10/99 constant or oﬀ-season heating or cooling coeﬃcients.
aDistribution of parameter estimates after re-weighting to correct for sample entry and
attrition. See text.Table 4
Household Consumption Changes
Between Summer 2000 and Pre-Crisis Years,
By Billing Cohort
(Adjusted for weather and trend)
Billing Consumption Average Price
Month Cohorts Change (Percent)a (Cents/KWh)
June 1 - 7 −0.9 12.0
June 8 - 14 −1.4 12.5
June 15 - 21 −0.9 14.2
July 1 - 7 −0.5 17.9
July 8 - 14 −0.4 19.6
July 15 - 21 −2.9 20.0
August 1 - 7 −6.5 22.0
August 8 - 14 −9.7 22.9
August 15 - 21 −11.8 23.2
September 1 - 7 −12.7 13.7
September 8 - 14 −12.4 13.3
September 15 - 21 −10.1 13.0
October 1 - 7 −7.5 13.3
October 8 - 14 −5.3 13.3
October 15 - 21 −4.2 13.3
Notes: Figures reported are averagesover households in the cohorts
listed for bills ending in the month shown (see text).
aAverage change in consumption from the same months of pre-
crisis years, adjusted for weather and trend (see text). Changes
expressed as a percentage of average pre-crisis consumption.Table 5
The 2001 Conservation Rebate Program:
Qualifying Households and Consumption Changes
Fraction of Average Consumption Change
Households Qualifying from Pre-Crisis Periodb
Month Actual Adjusteda Qual. Households All Households
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Pre-Program:
April 32 38 −32 − 9
May 36 40 −30 − 9
Program Months:
June 42 39 −31 −11
July 41 43 −36 −13
August 41 30 −34 −13
September 31 27 −41 −14
June-September 39 35 −35 −13
Post-Program:
October 28 31 −31 − 8
November 30 32 −26 − 7
Notes.
aAdjusted entries show the fraction of households that would still have qualiﬁed
in the absence of consumption changes attributable to weather alone.
bAverage change in consumption from the same months of pre-crisis years, ad-
justed for weather and trend (see text). Changes expressed as a percentage of
average pre-crisis consumption.Table 6
The 2001 Conservation Rebate Program:
Cost Estimates for Energy “Saved”
Average Consumption Reduction,
All Households (KWh)a Average Households Program
Rebatea Qualifying Cost Estimate
(dollars) (percent) Cumulativeb Programc (cents per KWh) Program
Month (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) × (2) ÷ (4)
June 10.43 42 54 15 29
July 11.41 41 66 26 18
August 12.06 41 64 24 20
September 10.95 31 69 30 11
June-September 11.03 39 63 24 18
Notes.
aFigures standardized to a 30-day billing month in this table for comparablility.
bAverage change in consumption from the same months of pre-crisis years (1998
and 1999), adjusted for weather and trend.
cColumn (3) less the weather- and trend-adjusted reduction in average consump-
tion (relative to the pre-crisis period) already achieved in the adjacent non-program
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Fig. 1.   Average Residential Electricity Price, 1998−2001
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Fig. 3.   Predicted and Actual Average Within−Household Consumption
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Fig. 4.   Average Within−Household Consumption Changes Relative to the



























Fig. 5.  Cross−Section Distribution of Households’ Year−Over−Year
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Consumption in August 1999 (KWh)
Fig. 6.   Households’ Consumption Changes and Levels




























Spike Price Cap Rebates Surcharges
Fig. 7.  Average Within−Household Consumption Changes Relative to the
Same Months During Pre−Crisis Years, Weather and Trend Removed